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BANKING & FINANCE
Glenpool Utility Services Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Dist. No. 2., 861
F.2d 1211
Appellant Water District No. 2 appeals a district court decision de-
nying it declaratory and injunctive relief in a suit to determine the rights
to furnish water to an annexed area of land. Reversed in part and
remanded.
Water District No. 2 is a rural district which was constructed using
funds borrowed from the Farmers Home Administration (FHA). By us-
ing this method of financing, the court of appeals held that the water
district came under the provisions of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), which states
that the service area of an entity owing money to the FHA cannot be
reduced by an act of a municipal corporation or similar public body.
The court of appeals noted that since the state of Oklahoma had allowed
for the acceptance of the federal loan money which was given, all of its
political subdivisions, including the Glenpool Utility Services Authority,
were bound and limited by the terms of § 1926.
United States v. Central Bank, 843 F.2d 1300
Appellant Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) appeals the district
court's refusal to enforce an I.R.S. administrative levy on taxpayer prop-
erty held by Central Bank. Reversed.
The thrust of Central Bank's argument was that under Colorado
law, it had a perfected security interest in the accounts of the delinquent
taxpayer which would take precedence over subsequent executions, in-
cluding I.R.S. levies. In reversing, the court of appeals noted that while
state court interpretations of lien priority are due some weight, they are
not binding under the terms of the Federal Tax Lien Act. Here, the
court of appeals held that Central Bank's interest in the taxpayer's ac-
counts was only an unperfected setoff right, and the I.R.S. levy took pri-
ority over it.
FDIC v. Galloway, 856 F.2d 112
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), plaintiff below,
appeals the finding of the district court that guarantors were not liable
on certain promissory notes of the bank to which it was the successor in
interest. Reversed and remanded.
Defendants signed unconditional guarantees for any and all indebt-
edness of the borrower to the bank which were to be valid until can-
celled by written notice. Contrary to the district court's finding, the
panel held that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) bars defendants' reliance on fraud
in the inducement due to the bank's misrepresentations. The agree-
ment failed to meet section 1823(e) requirements of a writing approved
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by either the bank's board or loan committee, kept with bank records.
The panel further found the FDIC's knowledge of such fraudulent mis-
representations at the time it acquired the notes did not prevent applica-
tion of this section as a bar to defendants.
The panel also determined the six year federal statute of limitations
applied to this action on a continuing guaranty. Applying the Peterson
rule, the panel held a new cause of action accrues under the guaranty as
each underlying debt becomes due. Hence, only the first two notes in
this case were time-barred. Finally, the panel found defendants' guar-
anty of payment at maturity waived any requirement that the bank look
first to the borrower for payment. Therefore, the FDIC's right to en-
force the guaranty accrued at maturity of the note.
FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 865 F.2d 1134
Upon the insolvency of the Dominion Bank of Denver, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver, entered into a
Purchase and Assumption agreement, whereby it sold the "acceptable".
assets of the insolvent bank to an assuming bank and purchased, as a
U.S. insurance corporation, the remaining "unacceptable" assets.
Among the "unacceptable" assets was a letter of credit issued by one
bank to the insolvent bank. When the FDIC tried to draw on the letter
of credit, the issuing bank refused to honor it. The FDIC sued in district
court to obtain payment on the letter, but the court dismissed, holding
that Colorado law, the law to be applied, only allows the transfer of a
letter of credit where the letter is expressly designated as transferable or
assignable.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, applying 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A) and
by creating a new federal common law rule. The court held that there is
a need for a nationally uniform rule allowing the FDIC to acquire non-
transferable assets of a failed bank in the course of a Purchase and
Assumption. C
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